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Non-Technical Summary 
The recent financial crisis has put the German banking sector under enormous pres-
sure. Besides the macroeconomic drivers like, for example, the expansionary mone-
tary policy in major countries, insufficient risk management and weak corporate 
governance systems have been identified as the main reasons for the financial crisis.  
In Germany, corporate governance is weakened by the three-pillar structure of the 
German banking system that reduces the power of market for corporate control. Fur-
thermore, the large ownership stake of the government in the German banking sector 
weakens corporate governance, since government officials may have other interests 
than private shareholders and may be less motivated to monitor the management. 
Politicians may also be less educated and experienced to fulfil their role as monitor 
of bank managers. This corresponds to the results of a recent OECD report on corpo-
rate governance in the financial sector (Kirkpatrick, 2009). The report identifies ad-
verse incentives created by remuneration schemes together with insufficient moni-
toring by the supervisory board as one of the main reasons for the financial crisis.  
To improve corporate governance the German government has started several initia-
tives in the past two years. They mainly focus on improving the risk management of 
banks, on reducing the incentives for managers to increase short-term profits created 
by remuneration schemes and on further professionalizing the supervisory board. To 
reduce the incentives to take large risks, remuneration schemes for managers must, 
for example, in future be geared toward long-term performance and also reflect 
negative business trends, while the supervisory board must, henceforth, include at 
least one person that has the required knowledge, abilities and expert experience to 
properly fulfil his monitoring tasks. This should particularly improve corporate gov-
ernance in the public sector where members of the supervisory boards are often 
based on their political affiliation and not based on their experience and skills. 
Problematic is that several laws that were enacted in the past years to improve cor-
porate governance focus on listed firms. Furthermore, the recommendations and 
suggestions made by the German Corporate Governance Code are not legally bind-
ing even for stock corporations. In particular, most Landesbanken have so far ab-
stained from applying the code and enacted their own corporate governance guide-
lines. This reduces the comparability and transparency of corporate governance 
standards in particular in those banks that have shown the biggest corporate govern-
ance problems during the recent financial crisis. Recent empirical evidence, more-
over, suggests that shareholders pushed for greater risk-taking and not managers. 
This contrast with public view that the bank managers are pushed by aggressive re-
munerations schemes to increase risk-taking. This indicates that the recent legal and 
regulatory changes fail to remove all weaknesses of the German corporate govern-
ance system.  
 
Das Wichtigste in Kürze 
Die aktuelle Finanzmarktkrise hat das deutsche Bankensystem stark unter Druck ge-
setzt. Neben der expansiven Geldpolitik werden vor allem ein unzureichendes Risi-
komanagement und mangelnde Corporate Governance im Bankensektor für die Kri-
se verantwortlich gemacht. 
In Deutschland wird die Corporate Governance im Bankensektor durch die 3-
Säulenstruktur des deutschen Bankensystems geschwächt, die eine feindliche Über-
nahme praktisch unmöglich macht. Darüber hinaus wirkt sich der große Einfluss der 
öffentlichen Hand negativ auf die Corporate Governance in deutschen Banken aus, 
da Politiker andere Ziele haben und weniger motiviert sein könnten, das Manage-
ment der Bank zu kontrollieren, als Privatpersonen. Das stimmt mit den Ergebnissen 
einer Studie der OECD  (Kirkpatrick, 2009) überein, nach der falsche Vergütungs-
systeme für Manager und mangelnde Kontrolle durch den Aufsichtsrat die Haupt-
gründe für die Finanzmarktkrise sind. 
Die Bundesregierung hat in denn vergangenen zwei Jahren mehrere Initiativen ge-
startet, um die Corporate Governance bei Banken zu verbessern. Sie konzentrieren 
sich überwiegend auf die Vergütung von Managern und auf die Stärkung des Auf-
sichtsrats. Um den Anreiz zur Steigerung kurzfristiger Gewinne zu reduzieren, soll 
die Managerentlohnung zum Beispiel künftig verstärkt die langfristige Entwicklung 
berücksichtigen und auch negative Geschäftsentwicklungen widerspiegeln. Der Auf-
sichtsrat soll in Zukunft hingegen mindestens einen Finanzexperten enthalten, damit 
er seine Kontrollfunktion besser ausüben kann. Das sollte insbesondere die Corpora-
te Governance bei den öffentlichen Banken stärken, da die Mitglieder des Aufsichts-
rats von Unternehmen im öffentlichen Sektor häufig nicht anhand ihrer Qualifikati-
on und ihrer Erfahrung, sondern anhand ihres Parteibuchs ausgewählt werden.  
Problematisch ist, dass viele der Gesetze, die in den vergangenen Jahren zur Stär-
kung der Corporate Governance verabschiedet wurden, nur für börsennotierte Un-
ternehmen gelten. Darüber hinaus ist der Deutschen Corporate Governance Kodex 
selbst für börsennotierte Unternehmen nicht gesetzlich verpflichtend. Insbesondere 
die Landesbanken haben bisher davon abgesehen, den Kodex anzuwenden und an-
statt dessen eigene Standards eingeführt. Das reduziert die Vergleichbarkeit und die 
Transparenz von Corporate Governance Standards insbesondere bei den Banken, die 
die größten Corporate Governance Probleme in der Krise gezeigt haben. Aktuelle 
Studien für den Bankensektor deuten darüber hinaus darauf hin, dass nicht die Ma-
nager, sondern die Aktionäre ein hohes Risiko eingehen wollten. Das widerspricht 
der öffentlichen Meinung, dass die Manager deutscher Banken durch aggressive 
Vergütungssysteme verleitet wurden, hohe Risiken einzugehen. Daran wird auch 
deutlich, dass die aktuellen gesetzlichen und regulatorischen Änderungen nicht alle 
Schwächen des deutschen Corporate Governance Systems beseitigt haben.  
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Abstract 
This paper gives an overview over corporate governance and banking regulation in 
Germany. Particular attention is put on legal and regulatory changes that were made 
in response to the financial market crisis. The paper shows that the changes mainly 
focus on the remuneration of managers and on further professionalizing the supervi-
sory board. Problematic is that several laws that were enacted in the past years to 
improve corporate governance focus on listed firms. Furthermore, some of the rec-
ommendations and suggestions made to improve corporate governance in Germany 
are not legally binding even for stock corporations. Recent empirical evidence, 
moreover, suggests that bank shareholders pushed for greater risk-taking and not 
managers. This contrast with public view that the bank managers are pushed by ag-
gressive remunerations schemes to increase risk-taking and indicates that the recent 
legal and regulatory changes fail to remove all weaknesses of the German corporate 
governance system.  
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 1 Introduction 
 
The recent financial crisis has put the German banking sector under enormous 
pressure. Banks had to massively write-down bad loans and needed large capital 
injections to offset their existing write-downs and to prevent a systemic collapse 
of the German banking system. Further write-offs are expected in the future. The 
Deutsche Bundesbank (2009a), for example, estimates that German banks have 
to make further write-off in the range between 50 and 75 billion euros up to the 
end of 2010. Besides the macroeconomic drivers like, for instance, the expan-
sionary monetary policy in major countries, insufficient risk management and 
weak corporate governance systems are deemed the main reasons for the crisis 
according to the OECD (Kirkpatrick, 2009). In particular, adverse incentives 
created by remuneration schemes and insufficient monitoring by the supervisory 
board are regarded as the main microeconomic drivers of the crisis.  
This study analyzes the corporate governance systems in the German banking 
sector and provides an overview over and an assessment of recent changes in 
corporate governance and banking regulation. In the next section, I give a brief 
overview over the German banking system, before I focus on the systems of 
corporate governance in German banks in Section 3. Section 4 concentrates on 
the role of the supervisory board as internal corporate governance mechanism, 
while Section 5 briefly describes corporate governance legislation in Germany 
up to 2007. Since weak corporate governance systems have been identified as 
one of the main reasons for the recent financial crisis, Section 6 gives a brief 
overview over the initiatives that were started by the German government in 
2008 and 2009 to improve corporate governance in Germany. For an overview 
over the main anti-crisis measures of the German government see Box 1. Sec-
tion 7 concludes.  
2 Overview over the German Banking Sector 
The German banking system is a three-pillar system comprising commercial 
banks, savings (‘Sparkassen’) and cooperative banks (‘Genossenschafts-
banken’). The distinction between these types of banks is made based on the le-
gal form of these institutions. While commercial banks are governed by private 
law and operate nationwide, savings banks are governed by public law. Since 
savings banks are owned by municipalities or counties, their business area is lo-
cally or regionally restricted. Cooperative banks operate on a regional basis as 
well. They are owned by their customers and follow the cooperative principle 
according to which one person has only one vote independent of the number of 
shares he owns. 
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 Box 1: Main Legal and Regulatory Changes in Response to the Financial Crisis  
In response to the financial crisis several initiatives were started to improve corporate governance in Ger-
many. They mainly focus on: 
? Management Compensation and the 
? Supervisory Board 
1) Management Compensation 
To reduce the incentives for managers to increase short-term profits the following changes have been made: 
? Reform of the German Corporate Governance Code (in force since 18.06.2009) 
- recommends that the management board should manage the enterprise with the objective of sustainable 
creation of value and in the interest of the enterprise and its stakeholders. 
- recommends that management compensation should be appropriate in terms of personal performance, the 
performance of the enterprise and the common level of compensation in the industry 
- recommends that the supervisory board makes sure that the variable compensation elements are based on 
a multi-year assessment with positive and negative developments be taken into account 
? New Minimum Requirements for Risk Management (MaRisk) (to be implemented by 31.12.2009) 
- requires that the variable compensation for staff members in risk-relevant positions should take due ac-
count of the risk taken 
- stipulates that the level of the variable compensation should also reflect negative business trends 
? Law on the Appropriateness of Executive Remuneration (VorstAG) (in force since 5.08.2009) 
- requires that management compensation should be appropriate in terms of personal performance and the 
common level of compensation in the industry/country 
- stipulates that the variable compensation components should be based on a multi-year assessment 
- requires that managers are allowed to use their stock options at the earliest four years after they were 
granted  
- increases the disclosure requirements for management compensation further to improve transparency  
- the general meeting of stock corporations can, henceforth, make a non-binding vote on management com-
pensation 
2) Supervisory Board 
The following legal and regulatory changes have been made to further professionalize the supervisory 
board: 
? Reform of the German Corporate Governance Code (in force since 18.06.2009) 
- recommends that the full supervisory board determines the total compensation of the management board 
- recommends that the chairman of the audit committee shall be a financial expert 
? New Minimum Requirements for Risk Management (MaRisk) (to be implemented by 31.12.2009) 
- makes a remuneration committee mandatory for banks 
- requires that the management board reports the supervisory board at least once a year on all severe prob-
lems that were identified during the internal audit and on all problems which have not yet been remedied 
? Law on the Appropriateness of Executive Remuneration (VorstAG) (in force since 5.08.2009) 
- requires that the decision on management compensation is made by the full supervisory board and not by 
a special committee  
- increases the power of the supervisory board to reduce management compensation retroactively if the 
situation of the company deteriorates 
- increases the liability of the supervisory board if management compensation is unreasonably high 
? Accounting Law Reform Act (BilMoG) (in force since 29.05.2009) 
- makes an audit committee mandatory for capital market oriented institutions 
- requires that the audit committee includes at least one independent financial expert 
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 While the goal of commercial banks is profit maximization, savings banks and 
cooperative banks have social goals as well. Both savings banks and cooperative 
banks have central institutions that were originally founded for providing devel-
opment financing in their regions and for acting as central banking institutions. 
In contrast to savings banks and cooperative banks, the central institutions oper-
ate nationwide and are less restricted in their business activities. This has be-
come visible during the crisis, since the central institutions of the savings banks 
(‘Landesbanken’) recorded high losses owing to their activities on the interna-
tional financial market. Besides commercial, savings and cooperative banks, the 
German banking sector also includes mortgage banks (‘Realkreditinstitute’) and 
building societies (‘Bausparkassen’) that operate in all three sectors of the bank-
ing system providing medium- and long-term credit secured against domestic 
real-estate. There are also several special purpose banks that promote economic 
and social development through lending, equity investment and technical assis-
tance.   
The importance of each of these banking groups is reflected in Figure 1. The 
first pillar of the German banking system comprises the group of commercial 
banks. This group includes the four large domestic banks that are commonly re-
ferred to as the ‘Big Banks’ (‘Großbanken’) as well as a number of smaller re-
gional and other credit institutions. The four Großbanken are the Deutsche 
Bank, Commerzbank/Dresdner Bank, Hypovereinsbank and Postbank. Together 
with the smaller commercial banks they accounted for 29 percent of total bank-
ing sector assets in Germany in 2008. The second pillar comprises the savings 
banks and the Landesbanken. They had a market share of 34 percent in 2008. 
The cooperative banks and their central institutions constitute the third pillar of 
the German banking system. Together they owned 11 percent of total banking 
sector assets in 2008. Owing to the large market share of the savings banks and 
the Landesbanken as well as several special purpose banks which are either di-
rectly or indirectly owned by the federal or state government, government own-
ership in the banking is more important in Germany than in other developed 
countries. The influence of the state has increased further in the past two years 
as a result of the financial crisis. Commerzbank, for example, got a capital injec-
tion of almost 18 billion euros from the Financial Market Stabilization Fund 
(SoFFin) that has given the state a stake of 25 percent plus one share in Ger-
many's second-biggest listed bank. Hypo-Real Estate has already been national-
ized.  
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 Figure 1:  Market Share of Different Bankin g Groups in the German Banking Sector 
(2008) 
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Source: Bundesbank (2009b). Note Figure 1 presents the market share of different banking 
groups in the German banking system. The market share equals the ratio of total assets that 
were held by each banking group divided by total banking sector assets in 2008. 
3 Systems of Corporate Governance in the German Bank-
ing Sector 
Corporate governance deals with principal-agent problems between managers 
and shareholders. Such problems arise because managers (agent) and sharehold-
ers (principal) have the incentive to maximize their personal utility (Jensen and 
Meckling, 1976). Since contracts cannot completely specify a priori what the 
management has to do with the money and how the returns are divided between 
him and the shareholders, managers have considerable scope to increase their 
utility to the detriment of the shareholders (Shleifer and Vishny, 1997). The cor-
porate governance literature discusses different mechanisms to stop managers 
from increasing their utility. These mechanisms are broadly distinguished into 
internal and external devices for corporate control. While external corporate 
governance describes the links between the firm and its stakeholders and the 
general public, internal corporate governance mechanisms refer to the devices 
within the firm to reduce the principal-agent problem.1  
                                           
1  For a survey on various internal and external corporate governance mechanisms see 
Shleifer and Vishny (1997). 
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 The market for corporate control is an external corporate governance mecha-
nism. It disciplines the management, since poor performance increases the threat 
of a takeover and raises the probability that the incumbent managers loose their 
job (Manne, 1965). For this reason, Jensen and Ruback (1983) regard the take-
over market as part of the managerial labour market on which different man-
agement teams compete for the rights of managing corporate resources. Owing 
to regulations on entry, mergers, takeovers and administrative rules the power of 
the market for corporate control to discipline the management is lower in the 
banking sector than in the non-financial sector (Prowse, 1995). The requirement 
that takeovers in the banking sector need approval by the supervisor, for exam-
ple, considerably delays the acquisition process and makes hostile takeovers 
whose success typically depends on the ability to close the transaction quickly 
almost impossible in the banking sector (Prowse, 1995).2 Takeovers are also 
limited by restrictions that limit ownership in certain types of banks. In Ger-
many, for example, savings banks are not allowed to be taken over by commer-
cial banks. Only acquisitions within the savings banks sector are allowed. In the 
cooperative sector, takeover activity is limited by the cooperative principal of 
one person-one vote that makes acquisitions virtually impossible. This suggests 
that the three-pillar structure considerably restricts the power of the market for 
corporate control in the German banking sector  
Outside shareholders can discipline managers by monitoring their activities. 
However, given the information asymmetries between the management and the 
shareholders, each shareholder has to incur monitoring costs. For this reason, 
every shareholder will free-ride in the hope that other shareholders will do the 
monitoring (Jensen and Meckling, 1976). This leaves the management with con-
siderable discretion to divert corporate resources for their private benefits (Jen-
sen and Meckling, 1976). Since large shareholders have more voting rights and 
larger incentives to monitor the management than minority shareholders, they 
are better able to control the management then minority shareholders Shleifer 
and Vishny (1986, 1997). Large shareholders may also have access to superior 
information and be involved in the decision-making process by approving cer-
tain management decisions, since they usually have a seat on the board of direc-
tors, which is an internal governance mechanism. Board representation may be 
particularly important in the banking sector, since information asymmetries are 
larger in the banking sector than in other sectors of the economy (Levine, 2004). 
                                           
2  Furthermore, the supervisory approval process is often used by politicians and supervisors 
to block specific transactions in the banking sector. Köhler (2009), for example, finds that 
cross-border mergers and acquisitions (M&A) are significantly more likely in the EU 
banking sector if merger control is transparent and supervisors and politicians have less 
scope to block takeovers for opaque concerns. This corresponds to the results of a survey 
by the EU Commission (2005). The survey identifies the merger review process, the mis-
use of supervisory powers and political interference as an important barrier to cross-border 
consolidation in the EU financial sector. 
 5
 This makes monitoring more difficult and increases the scope of bank managers 
to extract private benefits. Information asymmetries may, hence, explain why 
banks are generally not widely (Caprio et al., 2007). However, ownership con-
centration may also come with some costs. Shleifer and Vishny (1986, 1997), 
for example, note that the interests of large shareholders may deviate form the 
interests of minority shareholders. It follows that concentrated ownership re-
duces the principal-agent problem between managers and minority shareholders, 
but creates a new agency problem between blockholders and minority share-
holders. The latter should be particularly severe in small to medium-sized banks, 
while they should be less important for the largest German banks that usually 
have a more dispersed ownership structure owing to larger capital needs and 
cross-holdings with other banks. 
Savings and cooperative banks are an exemption. While ownership in coopera-
tive banks is widely dispersed owing to the cooperative principle that gives each 
shareholder only one vote, savings banks are usually fully owned by their mu-
nicipality or the local government. The Landesbanken are, in contrast, jointly 
owned by their local savings banks and the federal states. As a result of the fi-
nancial crisis the influence of the public sector in the German banking has fur-
ther increased. This raises questions, since government participation in banks is 
usually found to not improve corporate governance in the banking sector be-
cause government officials may have other interests than private shareholders 
and may be less motivated to monitor the management. Politicians may also be 
less educated and experienced to fulfil their role as monitor of bank managers. 
Furthermore, the state faces a conflict of interest owing to his role as regulator 
and shareholder. If private shareholders speculate that banks are more likely to 
be bailed-out in a crisis, they may reduce their monitoring incentives. Together 
this may increase the scope of public bank managers to divert corporate re-
sources for personal benefits. Finally, Shleifer and Vishny (1998) point out that 
politicians may use their power as bank shareholders to maximize their own per-
sonal objectives. Sapienza (2004), for example, finds that state-owned banks 
charge systematically lower interest rates in regions in which the political party 
affiliated with the bank is stronger. This suggests that government ownership 
weakens corporate governance in the German banking sector. The corporate 
governance problems may also explain the severe difficulties of the Landes-
banken during the crisis. WestLB, for example, faced serious problems that ne-
cessitated a rescue package by the German government in early 2008. In addi-
tion, many other public sector banks, including BayernLB, NordLB, HSH Nord-
bank, SachsenLB and LBBW, needed financial support from the German gov-
ernment. For a list of banks that benefited from the rescue programme see Table 
1. 
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4 Board Composition and Board Structure 
Owing to intense regulation and large information asymmetries bank managers 
are mainly disciplined by internal governance mechanisms. One important inter-
nal governance mechanism is the board of directors. A specific feature of the 
German board system is that it has a two-tiered structure with a management 
(‘Vorstand’) and a supervisory board (‘Aufsichtsrat’ or ‘Verwaltungsrat’). In 
this system, the management board is responsible for the operating business, 
while the task of the supervisory board is to appoint, to dismiss and to monitor 
the management. The members of the supervisory board are usually representa-
tives of large shareholders. Owing to their representation on the supervisory 
board large shareholders have better access to information than minority share-
holders. This may be particularly important in the banking sector in which in-
formation asymmetries are larger and may explain why ownership concentration 
is usually larger in the banking sector than in the non-financial sector (Caprio et 
al., 2007). Another distinguishing feature of the German board system is the sys-
tem of co-determination that gives the employees a role in the management of 
the company. For listed firms with more than 2000 employees, the Co-
Determination Act of 1976 has created a system of quasi-parity co-determination 
according to which employee representative make up half of the supervisory 
board. The chairman of the supervisory board, however, is a shareholder repre-
sentative that has the casting vote in case of a stale-mate. In companies with less 
than 2000 employees, one third of the supervisory board has to consist of em-
ployee representatives.  
To ensure the independence the supervisory board the German Corporate Gov-
ernance Code recommends that only two former members of the management 
board are allowed to be members of the supervisory board. Furthermore, super-
visory board members shall not exercise directorships or similar positions or ad-
visory tasks for important competitors of their enterprise. To accomplish its du-
ties, the German Corporate Governance Code recommends that the manage-
ment periodically reports to the supervisory board on all important questions. 
The supervisory board shall, moreover, require the management to obtain its 
prior approval before entering into certain important transactions. To make it 
possible to deal with complex issues the supervisory board is recommended to 
form committees consisting of a smaller number of members with sufficient ex-
pertise. One of these committees should propose suitable candidates to the su-
pervisory board for recommendation to the general meeting (nomination com-
mittee). Further committees should be formed that deal with subjects like the 
strategy of the enterprise, the compensation of the members of the management 
board (remuneration committee), investments and financing. The supervisory
 Table 1: Government Rescue Programme for the German Banking Sector 
Name of the Bank Amount 
(in billion euros)
Measure Institution 
Aareal Bank 0.5 Silent Participation Financial Market Stabilization Fund (SoFFin) 
 4.0 Guarantee Financial Market Stabilization Fund (SoFFin) 
Bayerische Landesbank (Bayern LB) 10.0 Equity Capital Federal State of Bavaria 
 4.8 Guarantee Federal State of Bavaria 
 15.0 Guarantee Financial Market Stabilization Fund (SoFFin) 
Commerzbank 15.0 Guarantee Financial Market Stabilization Fund (SoFFin) 
 8.2 Silent Participation Financial Market Stabilization Fund (SoFFin) 
 10.0 Equity Capital  Financial Market Stabilization Fund (SoFFin) 
Düsseldorfer Hypothekenbank 2.5 Guarantee Financial Market Stabilization Fund (SoFFin) 
HSH Nordbank 30.0 Guarantee Financial Market Stabilization Fund (SoFFin) 
 3.0 Equity Capital Federal State of Schleswig Holstein & Hamburg 
 10.0 Guarantee Federal State of Schleswig Holstein & Hamburg 
Hypo Real Estate 52.0 Guarantee Financial Market Stabilization Fund (SoFFin) 
 3.0 Equity Capital Financial Market Stabilization Fund (SoFFin) 
IKB Deutsche Industriebank AG 5.0 Guarantee Financial Market Stabilization Fund (SoFFin) 
Landesbank Baden-Wuerttemberg (LBBW) 5.0 Equity Capital Federal State of Baden-Wuerttemberg and City of Stuttgart 
 12.7 Guarantee Federal State of Baden-Wuerttemberg and City of Stuttgart 
Norddeutsche Landesbank (NordLB) 20.0 Guarantee Federal States of Lower Saxony and Saxony-Anhalt. 
Sächsische Landesbank (SachsenLB) 2.8 Guarantee Federal State of Saxony 
Volkswagenbank 2.0 Guarantee Financial Market Stabilization Fund (SoFFin) 
Westdeutsche Landesbank (WestLB) 3.0 Silent Participation Financial Market Stabilization Fund (SoFFin) 
  9.0 Guarantee Federal State of North Rhine-Westphalia and local Savings Banks Association 
Source: Petrovic and Tutsch (2009) and newspaper articles 
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 board can, moreover, arrange for committees to prepare supervisory board meet-
ings and to take decisions in place of the supervisory board. Particularly impor-
tant for the banking sector is the implementation of a risk (‘Risikoausschuss’) 
and an audit committee (‘Prüfungsausschuss’). While the audit committee han-
dles issues of accounting, the independence of the auditor, the issuing of the au-
dit mandate to the auditor, the determination of auditing focal points and the fee 
agreement, the duty and the responsibility of the risk committee is to control risk 
management and compliance.  
During the recent financial crisis, it has frequently been criticized that the risk 
committee did not adequately assess the risk management and the risk strategy 
of German banks. In particular, the role of the supervisory board of public banks 
is criticized.3 Since they are controlled by the federal states, the supervisory 
boards of public banks often include politicians. This raises questions as to 
whether government officials may have other interests and may be less moti-
vated to monitor the management than private shareholders. Furthermore, the 
members of the boards of public sector banks may not be elected based on their 
experience and skills, but based on their political affiliation. This is demon-
strated by Hau and Thum (2009). They analyze how the composition of the su-
pervisory board affects the performance of the 29 largest German banks in 2008. 
They show that the members of the supervisory board of public sector banks are 
less educated and less experienced than their counterparts of private banks. 
Their empirical results, furthermore, suggest that this might have contributed to 
the large losses of the Landesbanken in the recent crisis. 
5 Corporate Governance Regulation in Germany 
To improve corporate governance the German government enacted several laws 
in the past years. Most of these laws focus on listed firms. For a list of laws and 
their main changes see Table 2.  
The first law that has significantly improved the corporate governance of Ger-
man firms was the Law for the Control and Transparency in the Area of Organi-
zations (KonTraG) that came into effect in 1998. The KonTraG has extended the 
liability of the supervisory board, the management board and the accountants. In 
addition, it made the use of early warning and risk management systems manda-
tory for German firms. Further laws to improve corporate governance followed 
from a catalogue of measures to strengthen the integrity of companies and inves-
                                           
3  For example, after the state lending bank KfW had transferred 300 billion euros to Lehman 
Brothers, just after the bank failed, the Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung wrote ‘The overse-
ers on the hopelessly bloated 37-member (supervisory) board won't manage to dodge the 
question of how the bank ran billions and billions of taxpayer euros into the ground’ 
(Spiegel, 2009a). 
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tors’ protection that was presented by the German government in February 2003. 
The aim of this so-called ten-point programme was to increase transparency and 
to improve self-regulation in German firms. The new Law on Award Proceed-
ings (SpruchG) was the first law that followed form this plan. It came into force 
in September 2003 and deals with a shortening of the legal procedure called 
‚Spruchverfahren’, a legal action which shareholders can file, if they doubt the 
adequacy of the price they receive for their shares in case of a change of the cor-
porate form or a squeeze-out. The price will then be checked by an auditor ap-
pointed by court. In 2004, the Law on the Improvement of Investor Protection 
(AnSVG), the Law on the Introduction of International Accounting Standards 
and on the Protection of the Quality of Audits (BilReG) and the Law on Control 
of Financial Statements (BilKoG) followed.  
A further significant step in corporate governance regulation in Germany was 
the approval the Law on Corporate Integrity and Modernization of Rescission 
Law (UMAG) by the German Federal Council in July 2005. The UMAG has 
significantly amended the German Stock Corporation Act (AktG) with regard to 
directors' potential liability. Further laws that came into force in 2005 were the 
Law on Capital Market Test Cases (KapMuG) and the Law on the Disclosure of 
Management Compensation (VorstOG). While the KapMuG has introduced test 
case litigation for capital market investors who have sustained loss through 
false, misleading or undisclosed information, the VorstOG is designed to en-
hance transparency for investors as it obliges stock corporations to individually 
disclose what their management board members earn. In 2007, investor protec-
tion was further improved by the Transparency Directive Implementation Law 
that has transposed the EU Transparency Directive (2004/109/EC) into German 
law.  
In 2001, the German government additionally appointed a commission to work 
on essential statutory regulations for the management and supervision of listed 
companies in 2001. The standards are codified in the German Corporate Gov-
ernance Code that was adopted by the commission in February 2002. Since then 
the code has been amended several times. The German Corporate Governance 
Code aims at making the German corporate governance system more transparent 
and to promote the trust of international and national investors in the manage-
ment and supervision of listed German stock corporations. A major problem of 
the German Corporate Governance Code is that it is not legally binding. How-
ever, listed firms are required by Article 161 AktG to declare whether and to 
which extend they follow the recommendations and suggestions of the code. 
Furthermore, the 2009 code report indicates that almost 80 percent of the firms
 Table 2: Corporate Governance Legislation up until 2007 
Law for the Control and Transparency in the Area of 
Organizations (KonTraG) 
in force since 01.05.1998 
- extends the liability of the supervisory board, the management board and the accountants 
- makes early warning and risk management systems mandatory  
Law on Award Proceedings (SpruchG) 
in force since 01.09.2004 
 
- shortens the legal procedure called ‚Spruchverfahren’ if shareholders doubt the adequacy of the price they receive 
for their shares in case of a change of the corporate form or a squeeze-out  
- the adequacy of the price will then be checked by an auditor appointed by court 
Law on the Improvement of Investor Protection 
(AnSVG) 
in force since 21.04.2004 
- strengthens insider trading law 
- introduces better measures against market malpractices 
Law on the Introduction of International Accounting 
Standards and on the Protection of the Quality of Au-
dits (BilReG) 
in force since 10.12.2004 
- introduces IFRS accounting standards 
- strengthens the independence of the auditor 
Law on Control of Financial Statements (BilKoG) 
in force since 21.12.2004 
- establishes the Financial Reporting Enforcement Panel (FFEP) as an independent enforcement authority to examine  
- financial statements  
- allows the FFEP to take appropriate steps to enforce necessary corrections of accounting irregularities 
Law on Corporate Integrity and Modernization of Re-
scission Law (UMAG) 
in force since 01.11.2005 
- -introduces the business judgement rule as the new standard for the liability of the members of the management 
boardvis-à-vis the company  
- -makes it easier for minority shareholders to bring liability claims against members of the management board and 
the advisory board  
- -makes it more difficult to bring abusive claims by shareholders which aim to set aside shareholders' resolutions  
- -makes it easier to impose limits on the shareholders' right to speak or to ask questions during the shareholders' 
meeting  
Law on Capital Market Test Cases (KapMuG) 
in force since 20.09.2005 
- makes group litigation possible 
- introduces the possibility of test case litigation to establish whether market information were falsely given  
- or suppressed 
Law on the Disclosure of Management Compensation 
(VorstOG) 
in force since 11.08.2005 
- obliges stock corporations to individually disclose what their management board members earn 
- allows shareholders a company to opt out of disclosure of individual management board remuneration if they have 
at least a three-quarter majority at the general meeting. 
Transparency Directive Implementation Law (TUG) 
in force since 20.01.2007 
- requires the management board of listed firms to confirm the balance sheet (‘Bilanzeid’) 
- introduces new share ownership notification rules 
Source: KPMG (2009) and DSW (2009) 
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 listed in the DAX, Germany’s leading stock market index, apply the code (von 
Werder and Talaulicar, 2009). Including smaller market segments (TecDax, 
MDAX and SDAX), more than 70 percent of the listed firms abide by the rules 
of the German Corporate Governance Code. However, the report also indicates 
that while firms listed in the DAX have almost fully implemented the recom-
mendations and suggestions made by the commission, stock corporations listed 
in smaller market segments tend to deviate more often from certain regulations 
of the code.  
6 Anti-Crisis Measures in Corporate Governance in 2008 
and 2009 
In response to the financial crisis several initiatives to improve corporate gov-
ernance in the German banking sector were started in the past two years. In line 
with a recent OECD report (Kirkpatrick, 2009) the legislative and regulatory 
changes mainly focus on reducing the incentives for banks managers to increase 
short-term profits and on further professionalizing the supervisory board.4 For 
an overview over the main anti-crisis measures of the German government see 
Box 1. 
                                          
The first major initiative was to amend the German Corporate Governance 
Code. The amendments aim at strengthening the incentives for sustainable cor-
porate governance. The focus on sustainability is illustrated in Article 4.1 of the 
code. While the management board was previously only ‘responsible for man-
aging the enterprise independently’, the management board is now not only rec-
ommended to manage the company independently, but also ‘with the objective 
of sustainable creation of value and in the interest of the enterprise’. The 
amendments have also brought several changes that affect the remuneration of 
the management board. While it was previously allowed that special board 
committees decide on the remuneration of the management board, the revised 
version of the German Corporate Governance Code recommends that the full 
supervisory board determines the compensation of individual management board 
members (Article 4.2.2). The compensation structure shall, furthermore, ‘be ori-
ented toward sustainable growth of the enterprise’. The supervisory board shall 
also make sure that the variable compensation elements are based on a multi-
year assessment with both positive and negative developments be taken into ac-
count when determining the variable compensation components. All compensa-
tion components must, moreover, be appropriate, both individually and in total, 
and should not encourage taking unreasonable risks (Article 4.2.3).  
 
4  The focus on manager remuneration is illustrated by a statement of the Former Finance 
Minister of Germany, Peer Steinbrück. In August 2009, he noted that ‘There shouldn't be 
any more excessive pay and false incentives for exaggerated risk. So it's right for banking 
regulators to be putting the spotlight on payment rules’ (Spiegel, 2009b). 
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To further professionalize the supervisory board, the revised version of the gov-
ernance code, moreover, requires that the chairman of the audit committee ‘shall 
have specialist knowledge and experience in the application of accounting prin-
ciples and internal control processes’ (Article 5.3.2). The committee that pre-
pares for nominations of members of the supervisory board shall also be com-
posed of members who have the required knowledge, abilities and expert ex-
perience to properly complete their tasks (Article 5.4). Furthermore, to increase 
the independence of the supervisory board the code now includes a passage that 
the member of the management board ‘may not become members of the supervi-
sory board of the company within two years after the end of their appointment 
unless they are appointed upon a motion presented by shareholders holding 
more than 25 percent of the voting rights in the company’ (Article 5.4.4). 
The second major initiative to improve corporate governance in the German 
banking sector was the introduction of new Minimum Requirements for Risk 
Management (MaRisk). MaRisk was introduced in 2005 to implement the sec-
ond pillar of Basel II in Germany. It sets forth basic principles for risk manage-
ment. The principle-based character of MaRisk should give banks scope to tailor 
the implementation to their own particular situation. Banks and financial ser-
vices institutions are required to implement the new MaRisk by the end of De-
cember 2009. The new MaRisk incorporates the recommendations of the Draghi 
report that was prepared by the Financial Stability Forum (2008) and has 
changed the current regulation in three important dimensions.  
First of all, the revised MaRisk introduces tougher and more wide-ranging su-
pervisory requirements with respect to stress testing, liquidity risk and risk con-
centration. Important for large banking groups is that the new MaRisk explicitly 
requires banks to develop a risk strategy for the entire group. While it was pre-
viously sufficient to demonstrate that the institution has sufficient risk-bearing 
capacity at the level of each individual company, it now has to be demonstrated 
for the group as a whole. The second major change regards bank’s remuneration 
systems. While the remuneration and incentive systems previously did not have 
to contradict the aims set forth in the bank strategy, incentive schemes must now 
additionally be structured in a way that any possibility of manipulation is pre-
cluded and negative incentives are to be avoided. Remuneration schemes must 
also ensure that the variable component is based on the long-term performance 
and also reflects negative business trends. The structure of the incentive systems 
of individual business units should, moreover, take account of the overall bank 
performance. The third major change aims at further professionalizing the su-
pervisory board. The new MaRisk, for example, makes a remuneration  
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Table 3: Corporate Governance Legislation and Banking Regulation in 2008 and 2009 
New German Corporate Governance Code (in force since 18.06.2009) 
Cooperation between Management 
Board and Supervisory Board 
- The management board and supervisory board have to report each year on the enterprise’s corporate governance in the Annual Report and to explain possible 
deviations from the recommendations of the German Corporate Governance Code. 
Management Board 
  
  
  
- The management board should manage the enterprise with the objective of sustainable creation of value and in the interest of the enterprise and its stakeholders. 
- The full supervisory board determines the total compensation of the management board members and shall resolve and regularly review the compensation system. 
- Compensation of the management board should be appropriate in terms of his personal performance, the performance of the enterprise and the common level of 
compensation in the industry. 
- The supervisory board must make sure that the variable compensation elements are based on a multi-year assessment with positive and negative developments be 
taken into account when determining variable compensation components. 
Supervisory Board 
  
  
  
- The supervisory board can delegate preparations for the appointment of members of the management board to a committee, which also deals with the conditions of 
the employment contracts including compensation. 
- The chairman of the audit committee shall be independent and have specialist knowledge and experience in the application of accounting principles and internal 
control processes.  
- Management board members may not become members of the supervisory board within two years after the end of their appointment unless they are appointed 
upon a motion presented by shareholders holding more than 25 percent of the voting rights. 
- Members of the management board of listed firms shall not accept more than a total of three supervisory board mandates in non-group listed companies. 
New Minimum Requirements for Risk Management (MaRisk) (to be implemented by 31.12.2009) 
Risk-Bearing Capacity 
  
- stronger emphasis on process character 
- inclusion of all material risks in risk-bearing capacity analysis, using qualified expert assessment if necessary 
Risk Concentrations 
  
  
- stronger emphasis on proper management 
- clear statement that all risk concentrations associated with material risk have to be duly taken into account 
- assessment to risk concentrations associated with counterparty credit risk is to be based - where possible - on quantitative procedures, too 
Stress Tests 
  
- Hypothetical events will be used alongside historical events to represent exceptional but plausible events in stress tests. 
- Clarifications: stress test results are also to be given due consideration when assessing the risk-bearing capacity.
Liquidity Risk 
  
  
- regular performance of adequate stress tests over time horizons of varying length 
- development of contingency plans and regular review of underlying contingency measures 
- extended liquidity risk reporting requirements 
Interest Rate Risks in the Banking 
Book 
- ban on inclusion of undated own funds components in the present-value calculation of interest rate risk 
Consolidated Group-Level Risk Man-
agement 
- -existing consolidated group risk management requirements amended to clearly define the requirements to be met by superordinated enterprises pursuant to section 
25a (1a) of the German Banking Act and transferred to a module of their own 
Compensation Systems 
  
- variable compensation for staff members in risk-relevant positions should take due account of the risk taken 
- The level of variable compensation should also properly reflect future negative business trends 
Technology and Organisation - When issuing IT authorisations, care should be taken that members of staff only have those rights actually needed for their activity. 
Organisational and Operational Struc-
ture of Lending Business 
- Processing principles need to be formulated individually for transactions with hedge funds and private equity firms, too. 
- The exclusive use of external credit assessment is no longer an adequate basis for lending decisions. 
Organisational and Operational Struc-
ture of trading business 
- -Requirements for processes in trading business amended to include clause stipulating the intra-group transactions, too, can only be conducted on the basis of clear 
rules. 
- -verification of foreign business 
Source: KPMG (2009), DSW (2009) and Deutsche Bundesbank (2009c) 
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committee mandatory for German banks and requires the management board to in-
form the head of the supervisory board about the remuneration systems. In addition, 
the management board has to report the supervisory board at least once a year on all 
severe problems that were identified during the internal audit and on all problems 
which have not yet been remedied. 
Table 3 summarizes the main changes to the German Corporate Governance Code 
and MaRisk. Other laws that were enacted in 2008 and 2009 to improve corporate 
governance are the Accounting Law Reform Act (BilMoG) and the Act on Imple-
menting the Shareholders' Rights Directive. The BilMoG transposes the Directive on 
Statutory Audits of Annual Accounts and Consolidated Accounts (2006/43/EC) and 
the amending Directive (2006/46/EC) into German law, while the Act on Implement-
ing the Shareholders' Rights Directive (TUG) implements the European Sharehold-
ers’ Directive (2007/36/EC). The BilMoG makes some recommendations of the 
German Corporate Governance Code legally binding for capital-market oriented 
firms. Companies that have not yet established an audit committee as recommended 
by the code are, for instance, from now on legally required to do. The BilMoG, fur-
thermore, makes it mandatory to have at least one independent financial expert in 
the audit committee. In contrast to the BilMoG and the TUG that were enacted to 
implement certain EU directives into German law, the Law on the Appropriateness 
of Executive Remuneration (VorstAG) was enacted in response to the crisis. It re-
quires the introduction of an extended assessment basis for executive remuneration 
as well as options for limiting the variable component of the earnings of executives 
of listed German firms.5  
7 Conclusions 
The recent financial crisis has put the German banking sector under enormous pres-
sure. Banks had to massively write-down bad loans and needed large capital injec-
tions to offset their existing write-downs and to prevent a systemic collapse of the 
German banking system. Besides the macroeconomic drivers like, for example, the 
expansionary monetary policy in major countries, insufficient risk management and 
weak corporate governance systems have been identified as the main reasons for the 
financial crisis.  
In Germany, corporate governance is weakened by the three-pillar structure of the 
German banking system that reduces the power of market for corporate control. Fur-
thermore, the large ownership stake of the government in the German banking sector 
weakens corporate governance, since government officials may have other interests 
than private shareholders and may be less motivated to monitor the management. 
 
5  For more information on the changes made by the Accounting Law Reform Act (BilMoG) and 
the Law on the Appropriateness of Executive Remuneration (VorstAG) see Box 1. 
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Politicians may also be less educated and experienced to fulfil their role as monitor 
of bank managers. This may explain the large losses of public sector banks as com-
pared to private banks in the recent crisis and corresponds to the results of a recent 
OECD report on corporate governance in the financial sector (Kirkpatrick, 2009). 
The report identifies adverse incentives created by remuneration schemes together 
with insufficient monitoring by the supervisory board as one of the main reasons for 
the financial crisis.  
To improve corporate governance the German government has started several initia-
tives in the past two years. In line with the OECD the legal and regulatory changes 
mainly focus on improving the risk management of German banks, on reducing the 
incentives for managers to increase short-term profits created by remuneration 
schemes and on further professionalizing the supervisory board. To reduce the in-
centives to take large risks, remuneration schemes for managers must, for example, 
in future be geared toward long-term performance and also reflect negative business 
trends, while the supervisory board must, henceforth, include at least one person that 
has the required knowledge, abilities and expert experience to properly fulfil his 
monitoring tasks. This should particularly improve corporate governance in the pub-
lic sector where members of the supervisory boards are often based on their political 
affiliation and not based on their experience and skills. However, given the large 
number of less educated and inexperienced supervisory board members, the re-
quirement to have only one financial expert in the supervisory board may not be suf-
ficient for public sector banks. Problematic is, furthermore, that the new regulations 
do not encompass explicit criteria to assess the competence and experience of super-
visory board members.  
Recent empirical evidence, moreover, suggests that the focus of the legal and regula-
tory changes on the remuneration of managers is to narrow and falls short of ex-
plaining all weaknesses of the German corporate governance system. Fahlenbrach 
and Stulz (2009), for example, find no evidence that banks with CEOs whose incen-
tives were better aligned with interests of their shareholders performed better during 
the crisis, but, in contrast, some evidence that these banks performed even worse in 
terms stock returns and in terms of accounting return-on-equity. This is consistent 
with a recent paper by Beltratti and Stulz (2009) that shows that banks with more 
pro-shareholder boards performed worse during the crisis. This suggests that banks 
were pushed by their boards to increase risk-taking in order maximize shareholder 
wealth. Gropp and Köhler (2010) get the same result. They find that bank sharehold-
ers pushed managers to increase risk-taking. This contrasts with the public view that 
the managers are responsible for the crisis and pushed by remunerations schemes to 
increase risk-taking. 
Another problem is that several laws that were enacted in the past years to improve 
corporate governance focus on listed firms only. Furthermore, the recommendations 
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and suggestions made by the German Corporate Governance Code are not legally 
binding even for stock corporations. The latter should be particularly relevant for 
smaller credit institutions and for banks that are not listed, since the large banks that 
are listed on the DAX (i.e. Commerzbank/Dresdner Bank, Deutsche Bank) usually 
almost fully implemented the recommendations and suggestions made by the gov-
ernance commission. In particular, most Landesbanken have so far abstained from 
applying the code and enacted their own corporate governance guidelines. This re-
duces the comparability and transparency of corporate governance standards in par-
ticular in those banks that have shown the biggest corporate governance problems in 
the German banking sector during the recent financial crisis. This suggests that the 
recent changes fail to remove all weaknesses of the German corporate governance 
system.  
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